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Abstract
I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-oﬀers model of multilateral negotiations, a common means of
exchange whose strategic complexity has hindered previous modeling eﬀorts. Multilateral negotiations
occur in numerous settings in which one party wishes to trade with one of several others, but for con-
creteness I consider a buyer facing multiple sellers oﬀering potentially diﬀerent amounts of surplus to be
split. The basic model provides surprising insights about introducing competition to an initially bilat-
eral setting, while straightforward extensions provide empirical predictions about how the buyer’s choice
of conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations or auctions is aﬀected by factors including the
number of sellers, uncertainty when making the choice, and costs of participating in the procurement
process. More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in
settings featuring multilateral negotiations.
1 Introduction
Bilateral negotiations play an important role in economic theory and practice, but negotiations often are
multilateral in nature. For example, in a procurement setting a firm or government might negotiate to
purchase from one of several suppliers whose products diﬀer on dimensions such as quality or goodness-of-
fit. Likewise, a takeover contest might involve multiple potential acquirers who diﬀer in their synergies or
opportunity costs from completing the transaction. A high-end job candidate might have several employers
maneuvering for position, while a firm contemplating significant foreign direct investment might have multiple
governments as eager suitors.
Multilateral negotiations have received relatively little academic attention despite their empirical rele-
vance, perhaps because their strategic complexity has made them diﬃcult to analyze with formal models.
They feature elements of bilateral negotiations and auctions, both of which are potentially complex exchange
mechanisms that have been the subject of significant amounts of academic research.1 However, analyses
of bilateral negotiations by definition tend to emphasize bilateral settings, with some exceptions described
∗Email: charles.j.thomas.phd@gmail.com. Patrick Warren provided helpful comments, as did participants in the Industrial
Organization workshop and Junior Faculty Brownbag at Clemson University, and the IFREE lecture series at the Economic
Science Institute (ESI) at Chapman University.
JEL: C78, D44, D82
Keywords: negotiations, bargaining, auctions, procurement, dynamic games
1For surveys of the bargaining literature see Kennan and Wilson [1993], Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere [2002], and
Serrano [2008], while for surveys of the auction literature see McAfee and McMillan [1987] and Milgrom [1989].
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later that require one party to abandon current negotiations before beginning talks with a new potential
trading partner, or that consider exogenously specified outside options rather than endogenously determined
ones. Analyses of auctions focus on multilateral settings, but auctions lack the communication and interplay
inherent to multilateral negotiations.
Incomplete information is an important component of multilateral negotiations’ strategic complexity, so
in this paper I dispense with it to investigate whether existing models of bilateral negotiations with complete
information can be usefully extended to accommodate multilateral negotiations. In Section 3 I describe
related research that evaluates similar issues.
In Section 2 I develop an infinite-horizon alternating-oﬀers model of multilateral negotiations that applies
in numerous settings such as those described earlier, but for concreteness I consider a buyer negotiating
simultaneously with several sellers. The buyer wishes to trade with only one seller, and trade with diﬀerent
sellers can generate diﬀerent amounts of surplus to be split. In some cases rival sellers constrain the terms
of trade to the buyer’s benefit, but in others they are irrelevant to the negotiated outcome. The basic model
naturally extends the bilateral negotiation model from Rubinstein [1982], and it illustrates how negotiated
outcomes are aﬀected by introducing additional sellers into a bilateral setting, by the similarity of sellers in
terms of available surplus, and by the parties’ relative bargaining strengths. One important and unexpected
finding is that the buyer can be better oﬀ when it becomes less patient in multilateral negotiations, which
contrasts sharply with the eﬀect of impatience in bilateral negotiations.
In Section 4 I extend the basic model to evaluate the buyer’s choice of conducting procurement via
multilateral negotiations or an auction, which provides empirical predictions about the important issue of
institutional choice. I find that the buyer tends to prefer negotiations when the number of sellers is small,
when the sellers’ products are distinct or their production costs are quite diﬀerent, and when sellers face entry
costs that are suﬃciently low. One striking finding when sellers incur entry costs is that the buyer’s preferred
procurement mechanism can change multiple times within small ranges of those costs, which provides one
explanation for the coexistence of auctions and multilateral negotiations across apparently similar buyers in
narrowly defined markets.
More generally the model provides a tractable foundation for analyzing strategic problems in settings
featuring multilateral negotiations, including investment, product design, mergers, hold-up, dual-sourcing,
entry, and collusion. Section 5 describes some of those future research possibilities and provides concluding
remarks, while the Appendix contains all proofs.
2 The Basic Model of Multilateral Negotiations
Consider a buyer that wishes to trade with at most one of N sellers. Trade between the buyer and seller i
yields a commonly known surplus Vi ≥ 0 to be split between the two parties, where V1 > 0 and the sellers
are indexed so that V1 ≥ V2 ≥ · · · ≥ VN . The buyer and each seller i have instantaneous rates of time
preference rB > 0 and ri > 0. Unlike the Vi, the ranking of the ri across sellers is not tied to the index i.
Trade is conducted as follows, where time is measured in discrete periods t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .} that are of length
∆ > 0. In even-numbered period t ∈ {0, 2, 4, . . .} each seller i makes a proposal (si,t, Vi − si,t) ∈ [0, Vi]2 to
the buyer that specifies the amount si,t of the surplus Vi that seller i demands for itself, with the remainder
Vi − si,t that it oﬀers to the buyer. The proposals are made simultaneously and are revealed publicly when
received by the buyer, after which the buyer decides whether to accept one of the proposals. If the buyer
accepts one of the proposals, then the negotiations conclude. If the buyer rejects all of the proposals, then
2
in odd-numbered period t+ 1 ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . .} the buyer makes proposals (bi,t+1, Vi − bi,t+1) ∈ [0, Vi]2 to each
seller i that specify the amount bi,t+1 of the surplus Vi that the buyer demands for itself, with the remainder
Vi − bi,t+1 that it oﬀers to seller i. The proposals are made simultaneously and are revealed publicly
when received by the sellers, after which the sellers simultaneously decide whether to accept their respective
proposals. From the set of accepted proposals the buyer decides which transaction, if any, to consummate.
If the buyer trades with a seller that accepted its proposal, then the negotiations conclude. If no transaction
occurs, then play continues to the next period.
A transaction that occurs in even-numbered period t between the buyer and seller i yields them respective
payoﬀs (Vi − si,t) e−rBt∆ and si,te−rit∆, while a transaction that occurs in odd-numbered period t between
the buyer and seller i yields them respective payoﬀs bi,te−rBt∆ and (Vi − bi,t) e−rit∆. Losing sellers’ payoﬀs
are 0. If no transaction occurs in any period, then each party’s payoﬀ is 0. For notational convenience
define δk ≡ e−rk∆, where δk ∈ (0, 1) is player k’s discount factor, for k ∈ {B, 1, 2, . . . , N}.
Three issues must be clarified regarding the acceptance of proposals. First, I allow the buyer not to
consummate any transaction even if one or more sellers have accepted a proposal from the buyer. As will
become apparent later, this assumption prevents the buyer from extracting the entire surplus V1 from seller
1 by committing to engage in unfavorable trades. Second, in some period the buyer might accept one of
multiple proposals that give it the same payoﬀ. If so, I assume that from those proposals the buyer accepts
the one from the seller with the lowest index. Third, in some period several sellers might accept the buyer’s
proposal. If trade occurs in such an instance, and if multiple proposals accepted by sellers give the buyer its
highest payoﬀ, I assume that from those proposals the buyer trades with the seller having the lowest index.
The latter two tie-breaking assumptions address an equilibrium existence issue caused by an “openness”
problem that arises because the players’ allowable demands and oﬀers are drawn from continuous sets.
The preceding model extends the bilateral negotiation model in Rubinstein [1982] by allowing one buyer
to negotiate simultaneously with multiple sellers. The assumptions about proposal acceptance and the
public nature of the proposals keep the model close in spirit to Rubinstein’s model, while allowing for the
multilateral aspect.
The players’ strategies consist of proposals and accept/reject decisions at every decision point, all of
which can depend on all prior moves that led to a specific point in the game. I solve for the game’s pure
strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE), and for simplicity I focus on stationary SPNE outcomes:
SPNE outcomes supported by strategies for which each player k receives the payoﬀ πbok in all subgames
that begin with the buyer making oﬀers, and receives the payoﬀ πsok in all subgames that begin with sellers
making oﬀers.2
I characterize this game’s stationary SPNE outcomes by modifying the approach pioneered by Shaked
and Sutton [1984] for solving the bilateral negotiation model from Rubinstein [1982]. Their method uses
four variables. The first two variables are πB and πB, which are the infimum and supremum of the set of
the buyer’s SPNE payoﬀs, for SPNE in subgames beginning with oﬀers from the buyer. The second two
variables are π1 and π1, which are the infimum and supremum of the set of seller 1’s SPNE payoﬀs, for
SPNE in subgames beginning with oﬀers from the seller.
Shaked and Sutton [1984] characterize the extremal SPNE payoﬀs by demonstrating that the following
2Characterizing all SPNE outcomes has proven to be diﬃcult. It appears that the stationary SPNE outcomes are the unique
SPNE outcomes for three of the four parameter ranges listed in Theorem 1. In the fourth it appears there are multiple SPNE
outcomes. I have characterized some of them, but have been unable to establish I have characterized all of them.
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four constraints must hold.
πB ≥ V1 − δ1π1 πB ≤ V1 − δ1π1 π1 ≥ V1 − δBπB π1 ≤ V1 − δBπB
Roughly speaking, the first and third constraints tell a negotiator, “When you are making oﬀers, you need
not give too much.” The second and fourth tell a negotiator, “When you are making oﬀers, you cannot take
too much.” Manipulating these constraints reveals that each must hold with equality, and that
πB = πB =
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 and π1 = π1 =
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1.
Having established the SPNE payoﬀs are unique, one can show there is a unique SPNE.
The stationary SPNE outcomes with multilateral negotiations are derived by recognizing that versions of
the preceding constraints continue to hold, except in particular circumstances in which the credible prospect
of trading with seller 2 requires modifying one or more of the constraints. In some cases the modifications
involve introducing an even tighter constraint, and in others involve replacing a constraint with a looser one.
Theorem 1 reveals that trade in any subgame occurs between the buyer and seller 1 in the subgame’s initial
period.
Theorem 1 In subgames that begin with the buyer making oﬀers, in all stationary SPNE outcomes the
payoﬀs for the buyer and seller 1 are
πboB =
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 and πbo1 = δ1
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1 if V2 ∈
h
0, δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1
´
πboB =
V2
δ2B
and πbo1 = V1 − V2δ2B if V2 ∈
h
δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1, δ
2
BV1
i
πboB = V1 and π
bo
1 = 0 if V2 ∈
¡
δ2BV1, δBV1
¢
πboB = V1 and π
bo
1 = 0 if V2 ∈ [δBV1, V1] .
In subgames that begin with sellers making oﬀers, in all stationary SPNE outcomes the payoﬀs for the buyer
and seller 1 are
πsoB = δB
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 and πso1 =
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1 if V2 ∈
h
0, δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1
´
πsoB =
V2
δB
and πso1 = V1 − V2δB if V2 ∈
h
δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1, δ
2
BV1
i
πsoB = δBV1 and π
so
1 = (1− δB)V1 if V2 ∈
¡
δ2BV1, δBV1
¢
πsoB = V2 and π
so
1 = V1 − V2 if V2 ∈ [δBV1, V1] .
The unique stationary SPNE payoﬀs with multilateral negotiations are more complex than the unique
SPNE payoﬀs with bilateral negotiations, but the derivations of both outcomes share the fundamental
concept that a party formulating a proposal must explicitly consider its counterpart’s payoﬀ from rejecting
that proposal. With bilateral negotiations the counterpart’s payoﬀ from rejecting corresponds to incurring
delay and making a proposal next period. With multilateral negotiations there is the additional influence
of the buyer’s ability to trade with seller 2, which in several instances the buyer can use to dramatic eﬀect.
Theorem 1’s characterization of the buyer’s and seller 1’s stationary SPNE payoﬀs demonstrates that
whether seller 2 aﬀects the negotiations depends on the relationship among V1, V2, δ1, and δB. Seller 2 is
more likely to aﬀect the negotiations as V1 decreases or V2 increases, because those changes make sellers 1
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and 2 closer competitors in terms of what surplus they can oﬀer the buyer. Seller 2 also is more likely to
aﬀect the negotiations as δ1 increases or δB decreases, because those changes decrease the buyer’s relative
bargaining strength, and hence the portion of V1 it would obtain if seller 2 were not present. Consequently,
the surplus available from seller 2 is more likely to aﬀect the negotiated outcome.
It is instructive to focus on the novel impact of adding additional sellers to a bilateral setting, which
reveals that for low values of V2 the multilateral negotiations’ stationary SPNE payoﬀs are equivalent to
those from Rubinstein’s model of bilateral negotiations. Sellers 2 through N are strategically irrelevant to
the negotiated outcome when the surpluses available from them are so low, so the negotiations between the
buyer and seller 1 proceed as if those other sellers were not present. Figure 1 illustrates this range of V2,
by plotting the buyer’s SPNE payoﬀs in subgames beginning with oﬀers from the buyer (panel (a)), and in
subgames beginning with oﬀers from the sellers (panel (b)). As V2 increases from 0, for a range of V2 the
buyer’s SPNE payoﬀs remain fixed at their levels from bilateral negotiations.
Figure 1 Here
For intermediate values of V2 the multilateral negotiations have an unusual feature: when the sellers
make oﬀers, the buyer’s payoﬀ equals the net present value of what it expects to get next period ( V2δB versus
getting V2δ2B
next period). Oﬀering a player just enough to induce trade is a typical feature in bilateral
negotiations. However, when the buyer makes oﬀers, seller 1’s payoﬀ is less than the net present value of
what it expects to get next period. Instead, seller 1’s payoﬀ is constrained by the requirement that the
buyer not prefer to trade today with seller 2, which is equivalent to the net present value of the buyer’s
payoﬀ from waiting until the next period (V2 versus getting V2δB next period).
For high values of V2 the multilateral negotiations’ stationary SPNE outcome features the buyer extracting
the entire surplus V1 from seller 1 when the buyer makes oﬀers to the sellers. This is possible because it is
credible for the buyer to trade with seller 2 if seller 1 refuses the buyer’s oﬀer. Hence, it is as if the buyer
can make a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to seller 1, which enables the extraction of the entire surplus V1. For
such values of V2, Figure 1 (b) shows that diﬀerences in the SPNE outcome emerge for diﬀerent V2 based
on what seller 1 must oﬀer when the sellers make oﬀers to the buyer. When δBV1 > V2, the buyer’s payoﬀ
is δBV1: seller 1 oﬀers the buyer just enough not to reject all oﬀers and get V1 next period, and trade with
seller 2 is not a credible threat. When δBV1 < V2, the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2: seller 1 oﬀers the buyer just
enough not to trade with seller 2, which is a credible threat rather than rejecting all oﬀers and getting V1
next period.
At this point it is worth returning to the modeling assumption that the buyer is not committed to trade
whenever at least one seller accepts the buyer’s proposal. If the buyer were so committed, then with its
proposals the buyer always could extract V1 from seller 1. To see why, imagine the buyer oﬀered  > 0
to sellers 1 and 2. In any equilibrium, seller 2 accepts whenever seller 1 rejects, which forces seller 1 to
accept rather than receive a payoﬀ of 0. Letting → 0 completes the argument, which illustrates that such
commitment eﬀectively allows the buyer to always make seller 1 a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer. The problem is
that the buyer might prefer not to trade with seller 2, if by doing so the buyer’s payoﬀ V2− is less than what
the buyer would receive if the negotiations continued to the next period. In the high range of V2 described
in the preceding paragraph, the buyer actually prefers trading today with seller 2 rather than letting the
negotiations continue, so there is no sense in which the buyer has committed to a trade it prefers to reject.
Figure 2 reveals that the equilibrium payoﬀs in Theorem 1 have some unusual properties, relative to the
conventional wisdom derived from bilateral negotiation models. As a function of the discount factor δB , the
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figure plots the buyer’s stationary SPNE payoﬀ in multilateral negotiations (the solid line) and the buyer’s
SPNE payoﬀ in bilateral negotiations (the dashed line).
Figure 2 Here
Panel (a) considers subgames that begin with oﬀers by the buyer. When the buyer is suﬃciently
impatient, with its oﬀers it extracts the entire surplus V1 from seller 1. This feat is possible because the
buyer is so impatient that it can credibly commit to trade this period with seller 2 if seller 1 rejects the
buyer’s oﬀer.3 For intermediate values of δB the buyer does worse when it becomes more patient, which
contrasts with the conventional wisdom about the eﬀect of patience on bargaining outcomes. Finally, for
suﬃciently high values of δB the buyer’s payoﬀ is the same in multilateral and bilateral negotiations, because
the buyer is suﬃciently patient that it can protect its interests without resorting to the threat of trading
with seller 2. Note that the buyer’s payoﬀ at the beginning of this range of δB is strictly less than its payoﬀ
for very low values of δB. Only as δB approaches 1 does the buyer’s payoﬀ return to the same level as when
δB was small.
Panel (b) considers subgames that begin with oﬀers by the sellers. For low values of δB seller 1 anticipates
that the buyer will extract the entire surplus V1 if the negotiations reach the next period. To end the
negotiations in this period and get a positive payoﬀ, seller 1 therefore must oﬀer the buyer at least δBV1.
However, if V2 > δBV1, then the threat from seller 2 requires seller 1 to ensure that the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2.
Hence, for low values of δB the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2, and eventually switches to δBV1 as δB increases. Once
again, for intermediate values of δB the buyer does worse when it becomes more patient, and for high values
of δB the buyer’s payoﬀ is the same in multilateral and bilateral negotiations.
Corollary 1 evaluates the stationary SPNE outcomes from Theorem 1 as the time period between oﬀers
∆ → 0. Muthoo [1999, Ch. 3.2] suggests this limiting case is the appropriate one to consider, because a
party making a counteroﬀer has incentives to do so quickly to reduce its cost of delay. The limiting values of
the payoﬀs as ∆→ 0 also do not depend on who makes the initial oﬀers, so there is no first-mover advantage
in the limit. Letting ∆→ 0 simplifies matters by eliminating two of the relevant ranges for V2 from Theorem
1, and the stationary SPNE payoﬀs have an intuitively appealing form.
Corollary 1 As the time period between oﬀers ∆ → 0, in all stationary SPNE outcomes in all subgames,
the payoﬀs for the buyer and seller 1 approach
π∗B =
³
r1
r1+rB
´
V1 and π∗1 =
³
rB
r1+rB
´
V1 if V2 ∈
h
0,
³
r1
r1+rB
´
V1
´
π∗B = V2 and π
∗
1 = V1 − V2 if V2 ∈
h³
r1
r1+rB
´
V1, V1
i
.
These can be written more compactly as
π∗B = max
h
V2,
³
r1
r1+rB
´
V1
i
and π∗1 = min
h
V1 − V2,
³
rB
r1+rB
´
V1
i
.
In the limit, a player’s stationary SPNE payoﬀ in a subgame does not depend on whether the buyer or the
sellers are making oﬀers.
3As mentioned earlier, if the game’s structure required the buyer always to trade according to its best accepted oﬀer, then
the buyer could always extract V1 when making oﬀers: Seller 2 will accept any oﬀer giving it a strictly positive payoﬀ whenever
seller 1 rejects, so seller 1 could never reject an extremely unfavorable oﬀer.
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Corollary 1 completely characterizes the buyer’s and seller 1’s payoﬀs in all stationary SPNE outcomes
as the time period between oﬀers ∆→ 0. In those SPNE the division of the maximum surplus V1 depends
on whether seller 2 constrains the negotiations. If V2 is large enough to constrain the negotiations, then the
buyer’s payoﬀ is higher than it would be if seller 2 were not present, and seller 1’s payoﬀ is lower. This is
direct evidence of the benefit to the buyer of bringing an additional seller into an initially bilateral setting.
If V2 is small enough not to constrain the negotiations, then the buyer’s and seller 1’s payoﬀs are identical
to those in Rubinstein’s model. In fact, setting V2 = 0 gives Rubinstein’s bilateral negotiation model as a
special case.
Comparative statics regarding the players’ stationary SPNE payoﬀs, with respect to the discount rates,
also depend on whether seller 2 constrains the negotiations. If V2 is large enough to constrain the nego-
tiations, then changes in the buyer’s and seller 1’s discount rates do not aﬀect the parties’ payoﬀs. For
example, one special case of seller 2 constraining the negotiations is when V1 = V2, in which case the buyer
gets all of the surplus and the discount rates are irrelevant. If V2 is small enough not to constrain the
negotiations, then standard comparative statics emerge: as the buyer becomes more patient it does strictly
better in the negotiations and seller 1 does strictly worse, while the reverse holds as seller 1 becomes more
patient.
One thing to notice from the results in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 is that seller 2’s patience is irrelevant
to the negotiated outcome, even though the surplus V2 available from seller 2 might play a role. All that
matters is that seller 2 is ready to give the entire surplus V2 to the buyer when making an oﬀer, and is willing
to accept any oﬀer from the buyer. Therefore, seller 2’s patience is irrelevant because its behavior is driven
entirely by consideration of its payoﬀ in the current period.
In Section 4 I use the unique limiting values of the stationary SPNE payoﬀs π∗B and π
∗
1 to evaluate the
buyer’s choice of conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations or an auction. The limiting case
seems appropriate given the points raised immediately prior to Corollary 1, and the unique stationary SPNE
outcome seems to be natural one to consider. In Section 4 I also exploit the fact that π∗B and π
∗
1 can be
written as functions of the ratio of discount rates, rBr1 , which reflects the importance of relative bargaining
strength, rather than absolute. Before proceeding to that analysis, I place this new model in context.
3 Relationship to Prior Research
Earlier research considers various extensions of bilateral negotiation models to address the idea of a buyer
negotiating with multiple sellers. Below I describe representative examples that use models or ask questions
similar to mine, for the purpose of comparing their structure and predictions with the model described in
Theorem 1.4 ,5 The models that explicitly incorporate multiple sellers assume the sellers are identical, which
conforms to the special case of my model in which V1 = V2 = · · · = VN .
Shaked and Sutton [1984] model bilateral negotiations with complete information and alternating oﬀers.
The buyer bargains with one seller at a time, but can switch to a diﬀerent seller after some commonly known
length of time. Oﬀers from one seller are void upon switching to another seller. The authors find that
4Other papers that share some similarities include Reinganum and Daughety [1991, 1992], Hendon and Tranaes [1991],
Muthoo [1995], Chatterjee and Dutta [1998], and Marx and Shaﬀer [2010]. Two recent papers that consider multilateral
negotiations with incomplete information are McAdams and Schwarz [2007] and Thomas [2011]. See Thomas [2011] for
references to additional papers with incomplete information that consider some aspects of the multilateral negotiation problem
analyzed there.
5For clarity’s sake it is worth mentioning that these models and mine address an exchange problem that is distinct from the
multilateral bargaining considered by authors such as Krishna and Serrano [1996], in which multiple players bargain to split
one joint surplus. That setting emphasizes diﬀerent issues and is inherently diﬀerent from the one I am considering.
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the presence of another seller constitutes a credible threat that permits the buyer to obtain greater surplus
than if switching were impossible. The outcome as the switching delay approaches the length of a bargaining
period is identical to the outcome if the buyer instead conducted a first-price auction between the two sellers.
My model lets the buyer bargain simultaneously with multiple sellers, and the negotiations and an auction
have the same outcome only if seller 2 constrains the negotiated outcome.6
Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton [1989] modify Rubinstein’s bilateral negotiation model so that the buyer
can take up a commonly known and exogenously specified outside option only when it rejects the seller’s
oﬀer, while Muthoo [1999, Ch. 5.6] assumes the buyer can take up its outside option only after its oﬀer
is rejected. Shaked [1994] allows the buyer to take up its outside option after either party rejects, but
in each period Nature randomly determines which party makes an oﬀer. All three models’ equilibrium
payoﬀs share similarities with those in Theorem 1 if the payoﬀ from the exogenous outside option equals V2.
Despite the similarity of the modeling approaches, there are at least two reasons to prefer Section 2’s model
of endogenous outside options. First, the latter model illustrates how the outside option is determined, that
the payoﬀ from the outside option represents the entire surplus available from that alternative trade, and
that the patience of the alternative trading partner is irrelevant. Second, applications like those in Sections
4 and 5 make sense only if the outside options result from decisions by strategic actors.
Vincent [1992] considers simultaneous negotiations by adding an additional seller to a bilateral negotiation
setting with complete information in which only the sellers make oﬀers. He finds that the buyer might not
secure all gains from trade, due to the sellers’ ability to support collusive equilibria through the prospect of
potentially an infinite number of bargaining periods. My model diﬀers from his by allowing both the buyer
and the sellers to make oﬀers. This crucial distinction enables a seller to deviate profitably from collusive
behavior by accepting an oﬀer that ends the game, thereby avoiding retaliatory future punishment from rival
sellers.
Finally, Chatterjee and Lee [1998] model bilateral negotiations with complete information in which the
buyer can hold an oﬀer from one seller while it incurs a cost to acquire an oﬀer from another seller. The
important distinction from my model is that the authors assume the competing oﬀer is a draw from a com-
monly known and exogenously specified probability distribution, rather than being the outcome of strategic
interaction with another seller.
4 Multilateral Negotiations Versus Auctions
In practice the buyer must choose a method for conducting procurement, and the reality of such decisions
is one reason economists emphasize understanding the performance of diﬀerent voluntary exchange mecha-
nisms.7 In this section I use the unique stationary SPNE payoﬀs from Corollary 1 to directly compare two
commonly used procurement mechanisms: multilateral negotiations and auctions.
Bulow and Klemperer [1996] analyze a buyer’s choice between negotiations and auctions in a setting with
homogeneous products and incomplete information about sellers’ costs. They illustrate circumstances in
which a buyer prefers a simple second-price auction with N + 1 sellers to an optimal mechanism with N
sellers. The authors do not analyze a specific negotiation protocol, but let the optimal mechanism provide
an upper bound on the buyer’s payoﬀ from negotiating. Their results suggest that attracting more sellers
6As it would in the special case of my model that conforms to theirs, in which V1 = V2 = · · · = VN .
7For example, consider how the work by Chamberlin [1948] and Smith [1962] spurred research on the importance of institu-
tions in determining economic outcomes.
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can be more important than increasing the buyer’s bargaining strength.8 ,9
Prompted in part by the observation that multilateral negotiations and auctions are used by apparently
similar buyers in the same market, Thomas and Wilson [2002, 2005, 2012] use experiments to compare
both exchange mechanisms. In settings with incomplete information they consider first-price and second-
price auctions, homogeneous and diﬀerentiated products, and negotiations that diﬀer in the buyer’s ability
to provide verifiable information to a seller about oﬀers from rival sellers. The authors find that the
mechanisms’ outcomes are similar, and in some cases are statistically indistinguishable. They conduct
experiments because no formally solved models were available that considered the sort of negotiations in
which they were interested.
I evaluate the buyer’s choice by extending Section 2’s basic model in ways that make the institutional
comparison nontrivial; it will be evident that in the basic model the buyer weakly prefers multilateral
negotiations. This section’s goal is to provide some simple extensions that yield theoretical and empirical
insights, and that also suggest more complex or comprehensive extensions.
Three phases comprise the extended game: The surplus-determination phase consists of a move by
Nature that determines the Vi draws according to some commonly known probability distribution. The
planning phase consists of three choices that occur in a specific order: First, the buyer chooses publicly
between conducting multilateral negotiations or a first-price auction. Second, the buyer chooses publicly
which of the N sellers to invite to participate. Third, the invited sellers make simultaneous and public
decisions whether to participate. The procurement phase consists of competition amongst the participating
sellers. That competition is conducted via either the multilateral negotiations described in Section 2, or a
first-price auction in which each seller i makes a simultaneous price oﬀer pi ∈ [0, Vi] to the buyer. The buyer
purchases from the seller whose oﬀer gives the buyer its highest payoﬀ, Vi−pi, with ties handled in the same
fashion as in the multilateral negotiations. It is straightforward to establish that the buyer’s payoﬀ in a
first-price auction is the second-highest surplus from the set of participating sellers.10
The procurement phase occurs last in the extensions I consider below, but either the surplus-determination
or the planning phase can occur first. The order of those two phases determines whether the buyer and
sellers make their planning choices after or before they know the available surpluses.
4.1 Institutional Choice with Fixed Vi
Consider the case in which the surplus-determination phase occurs before the planning phase, and in which
the buyer incurs an incremental cost of conducting multilateral negotiations versus an auction, Cmln ∈ R. I
assume the buyer invites all sellers, and that all invited sellers participate, because participation is costless.
The only substantive diﬀerence from the basic model is the inclusion of the cost Cmln.11
From Corollary 1 the buyer’s payoﬀ in multilateral negotiations is
πmlnB = π
∗
B − Cmln = max
∙
V2,
µ
r1
r1 + rB
¶
V1
¸
− Cmln,
8 I do not address this issue in the analysis to follow, but one could do so. It is straightforward to generate examples that
give the opposite conclusion, which suggests the importance of incomplete information in making such comparisons.
9More recently, Bulow and Klemperer [2009] consider this choice when the mechanisms involve costly entry but diﬀer in
their timing. Their auctions involve simultaneous entry decisions followed by price competition. Their negotiations involve
sequential entry by sellers, where later sellers enter only if trade with earlier sellers is insuﬃciently attractive.
10For example, see Kim and Che [2004]. In this complete information setting the buyer’s payoﬀ also is the same in a Dutch,
English, or second-price auction.
11One also could include costs incurred by the buyer for each seller that participates. In Subsection 4.3 I consider costs
incurred by each seller that participates.
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while its payoﬀ in a first-price auction is
πfpaB = V2.
The following result is straightforward to obtain.
Proposition 1 Consider the case in which the surplus-determination phase precedes the planning phase.
The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if
Cmln < max
∙
0,
µ
r1
r1 + rB
¶
V1 − V2
¸
.
The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as Cmln decreases, as V1 increases or
V2 decreases, and as rBr1 decreases.
This simple extension of the basic model illustrates what factors make the buyer more inclined to use
multilateral negotiations. Figure 3 shows the buyer’s payoﬀ in both institutions, as a function of the ratio
of discount rates rBr1 , for some positive incremental cost of conducting multilateral negotiations, C
mln. Each
panel shows a parameter change that increases the range of rBr1 for which the buyer prefers multilateral
negotiations. Panel (a) shows that decreasing Cmln has the obvious eﬀect of increasing multilateral negoti-
ations’ attractiveness, because they become cheaper to conduct relative to an auction. Panel (b) shows that
increasing V1 increases the buyer’s payoﬀ from multilateral negotiations while leaving unchanged its payoﬀ
from a first-price auction. Increasing V1 in multilateral negotiations increases the amount of surplus to be
split between the buyer and seller 1, but in a first-price auction has no eﬀect because the buyer’s payoﬀ is
determined solely by V2. Panel (c) shows that decreasing V2 lowers the buyer’s payoﬀ in both institutions,
but to diﬀerent extents. In a first-price auction decreasing V2 reduces the buyer’s payoﬀ one-for-one, because
the buyer’s payoﬀ is V2. In multilateral negotiations decreasing V2 leaves the buyer’s payoﬀ unchanged in
the original instances in which seller 2 is irrelevant to the negotiated outcome, decreases the buyer’s payoﬀ
less than one-for-one in a range of cases in which seller 2 initially constrained the negotiations, and otherwise
decreases the buyer’s payoﬀ one-for-one. The net eﬀect makes multilateral negotiations more attractive for
a larger range of relative discount rates, rBr1 .
Figure 3 Here
Finally, each panel of Figure 3 illustrates that multilateral negotiations are relatively more attractive
as rBr1 decreases, which is a crucial element of the buyer’s choice between multilateral negotiations and an
auction. Reducing rBr1 reflects an increase in the buyer’s bargaining strength relative to seller 1, and by
conducting an auction the buyer forgoes any bargaining advantage it might have.
4.2 Institutional Choice with Random Vi and Costless Participation
Now consider the case in which the planning phase precedes the surplus-determination phase. The available
surpluses are unknown when the buyer chooses the procurement mechanism and which sellers to invite, and
when the sellers make their participation decisions. For simplicity I assume the Vi are independently and
identically drawn from U [0, 1]. I also assume ri = rS for each seller i, because otherwise the details of the
institutional choice depend in a straightforward but tedious way on the values of the ri and the realized Vi.
Finally, I assume the buyer invites all sellers, and that all invited sellers participate, because participation
is costless.
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The buyer’s payoﬀ in multilateral negotiations depends on the highest and second-highest realized Vi,
while its payoﬀ in a first-price auction depends on the second-highest realized Vi. To calculate the buyer’s
expected payoﬀs one therefore must consider distributions of the highest and second-highest order statistics
of N draws from U [0, 1]. Denoting those order statistics by V(1) and V(2), the distribution of V(1) is
G1(v) ≡ Pr
¡
V(1) ≤ v
¢
= vN ,
the distribution of V(2) conditional on the value of V(1) is
G2 (v | w) ≡ Pr
¡
V(2) ≤ v | V(1) = w
¢
=
vN−1
wN−1
,
and the unconditional distribution of V(2) is
G2(v) ≡ Pr
¡
V(2) ≤ v
¢
= vN +N(1− v)vN−1.
Corollary 1 gives the buyer’s payoﬀ for any particular realization of the Vi, so the buyer’s expected payoﬀ
in multilateral negotiations is
πmlnB =
∙Z 1
0
½Z v(1)
0
max
∙
v(2),
µ
rS
rS + rB
¶
v(1)
¸
G02
¡
v(2) | v(1)
¢
dv(2)
¾
G01
¡
v(1)
¢
dv(1)
¸
− Cmln
=
N − 1 +
³
rS
rS+rB
´N
N + 1
− Cmln.
Similarly, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ in a first-price auction is
πfpaB =
Z 1
0
v(2)G
0
2
¡
v(2)
¢
dv(2)
=
N − 1
N + 1
.
Proposition 2 Consider the case in which the planning phase precedes the surplus-determination phase,
and the Vi are iid draws from U [0, 1]. The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if
Cmln <
³
rS
rS+rB
´N
N + 1
.
The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as Cmln decreases, as N decreases,
and as rBrS decreases.
Proposition 2 illustrates that the buyer tends to prefer multilateral negotiations for low values of Cmln,
N , and rBrS . Decreasing C
mln has the obvious eﬀect of making multilateral negotiations relatively cheaper
to conduct. Decreasing N increases the expected diﬀerence between the highest and second-highest sur-
pluses. As Corollary 1 demonstrates, as that gap increases it is more likely that negotiations outperform an
auction. Likewise, decreasing rBrS strengthens the buyer’s bargaining position, an advantage that is forgone
by conducting an auction.
One also can assess how changing the variance of the Vi draws aﬀects the buyer’s institutional choice,
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say by considering mean-preserving changes in the distribution. A formal analysis is messy, even with the
Vi uniformly distributed, but the following informal argument demonstrates that increasing the variance
increases the relative attractiveness of multilateral negotiations.
Suppose the Vi are independently and identically drawn from U
£
1
2 − θ,
1
2 + θ
¤
for θ ∈
£
0, 12
¤
. If θ
is suﬃciently small such that 12 − θ ≥
³
rS
rS+rB
´ ¡
1
2 + θ
¢
, then seller 2 constrains the negotiations for any
realizations of the Vi. That is, even for the highest possible value of V(1)
¡
= 12 + θ
¢
and the lowest possible
value of V(2)
¡
= 12 − θ
¢
, V(2) exceeds the buyer’s share of V(1) from bilateral negotiations. Consequently, the
buyer’s expected payoﬀ is the same with multilateral negotiations or an auction, not counting any diﬀerential
cost of conducting negotiations.12 This informal analysis suggests that negotiations are more likely to be
used when sellers are more likely to diﬀer in their available surplus, such as when the buyer’s tastes tend
to be quite distinct for diﬀerent sellers’ products, or when there is significant cost variability across sellers.
Multilateral negotiations outperform auctions in such circumstances because the buyer’s bargaining ability
strongly influences the negotiated outcome, and that ability is wasted by conducting an auction.
4.3 Institutional Choice with Random Vi and Costly Participation
Finally, consider extending the preceding subsection’s analysis by having sellers incur a cost of participating
before they learn the Vi draws, Centry ∈ R+. This cost can reflect opportunity costs of designing prototypes,
evaluating production costs, assessing the product’s fit with the buyer’s preferences, or formulating an initial
proposal. I assume Cmln = 0 to focus attention on the uncertainty when decisions are made.
Costly entry has been considered in other oligopoly models, mainly to determine its eﬀect on prices and
welfare.13 A common finding is that the buyer might benefit from decreasing the size of the pool of potential
entrants, which in my extended model amounts to inviting fewer than N sellers to participate.
As a first step I consider the sellers’ participation decisions when the buyer invites all N sellers to par-
ticipate, for each institution x ∈ {mln, fpa}. Let πxS(n) denote a seller’s expected payoﬀ from participating
in institution x when a total of n sellers participate.
If Centry < πxS(N), then each seller participates with probability 1 because it expects a positive net
payoﬀ even if all of its rivals participate. With the Vi drawn from U [0, 1],
πmlnS (N) =
1−
³
rS
rS+rB
´N
N (N + 1)
and πfpaS (N) =
1
N (N + 1)
.
Because πmlnS (N) < π
fpa
S (N), in multilateral negotiations sellers stop participating with probability 1 at a
lower value of Centry than in an auction.
If Centry > πxS(1), then each seller participates with probability 0 because it expects a negative net payoﬀ
even if none of its rivals participate. Once again exploiting the Uniform distribution of the Vi,
πmlnS (1) =
µ
rB
rS + rB
¶µ
1
2
¶
and πfpaS (1) =
1
2
.
Because πmlnS (1) < π
fpa
S (1), in multilateral negotiations sellers stop participating entirely at a lower value of
Centry than in an auction. For later reference note that these values of Centry are invariant to the number
12The informal analysis is messy for larger values of θ, because in calculating the buyer’s expected payoﬀ one must account
for whether the realizations of the Vi are such that seller 2 constrains the negotiations.
13 For example, costly entry is examined in a Bertrand setting by Lang and Rosenthal [1991], in a Cournot setting by Dixit
and Shapiro [1986], and in an auction setting by Levin and Smith [1994].
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of invited sellers, because they are determined solely from a seller’s expected payoﬀ when it is the only
participating seller.
Finally, if πxS(N) ≤ Centry ≤ πxS(1), then I consider strategies such that each seller participates with
probability ρx ∈ (0, 1). The entry probability depends on the number of invited sellers and the value
of Centry.14 The equilibrium value of ρx equates a seller’s expected payoﬀ from participating and not
participating. Specifically, ρx solves"
N−1X
k=0
Ã
N − 1
k
!
(ρx)k (1− ρx)n−1−k πxS (k + 1)
#
− Centry = 0.
Once the entry probability is derived, the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is
πxB =
NX
k=0
Ã
N
k
!
(ρx)k (1− ρx)n−1−k πxB (k) ,
where πxB (k) denotes the buyer’s expected payoﬀ from institution x when a total of k sellers participate.
Even with the simple expressions for πxB(k) that precede Proposition 2 (substituting k for N as appro-
priate), the equilibrium values of ρx and πxB do not have convenient analytic expressions. However, the
equilibrium value of ρx can be solved numerically, from which πxB is easily calculated.
Figure 4 reports πmlnB and π
fpa
B as a function of C
entry, with panels (a)-(c) featuring diﬀerent numbers of
invited sellers. Each panel shows πmlnB for three values of
rB
rS
, while πfpaB is invariant to the parties’ discount
rates.
Figure 4 Here
The first insight from Figure 4 is that the buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations for low entry
costs, and strictly prefers a first-price auction for high entry costs. From Proposition 2 the buyer prefers
multilateral negotiations over an auction for any specific number of participants when Cmln = 0, and both
institutions’ eﬃciency implies that the sellers prefer an auction for any specific number of participants. For
suﬃciently low entry costs, all invited sellers participate in both institutions. Therefore, the buyer prefers
multilateral negotiations. As the entry cost increases further, sellers in multilateral negotiations participate
less frequently than they do in an auction. The decreased participation harms the buyer directly in the
negotiations because with fewer sellers the expected value of the highest surplus declines. Eventually this
decline swamps the buyer’s advantage from its bargaining ability. This eﬀect is clearly seen in the extreme
when Centry is such that no sellers enter with negotiations, but some sellers might enter with an auction.
Finding that the buyer’s preferred procurement method depends on entry costs illustrates an important
reason for considering costly entry. Levin and Smith [1994] found no such eﬀects in their analysis of costly
entry with diﬀerent auction formats, because the formats they considered all were revenue equivalent for
any particular number of actual entrants. Hence, the sellers’ entry probabilities were the same across
institutions. In contrast, the fact that payoﬀs in multilateral negotiations and a first-price auction diﬀer for
any specific number of participating sellers causes the buyer’s preference to depend on the level of Centry.
The second insight from Figure 4 is that the value of Centry at which the buyer’s institutional choice
changes increases as the buyer’s relative bargaining strength diminishes. Extreme values of rBrS illustrate
14While there exist asymmetric equilibria in which a subset of invited sellers participate with probability 0, I focus on
symmetric equilibria because of the strategic environment’s symmetry.
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this point clearly. As rBrS → 0 the buyer prefers a first-price auction for any C
entry > 0, because the
buyer’s overwhelming bargaining ability ensures that no sellers participate if the buyer uses multilateral
negotiations. As rBrS → ∞ multilateral negotiations and an auction become more similar for any specific
number of participating sellers. Hence, the sellers’ participation probabilities also get more similar, and the
value of Centry increases at which the buyer’s preferred choice changes.
Careful examination of Figure 4 reveals that the buyer’s expected payoﬀ is higher with fewer invited
sellers, for some values of Centry. This result is consistent with findings mentioned earlier from Lang and
Rosenthal [1991] and Levin and Smith [1994], and it stems from the interplay between the number of invited
sellers and the invited sellers’ probability of participating. One implication of this finding is that the buyer’s
ability to restrict the number of sellers it invites might eliminate the change in the buyer’s institutional choice
that was highlighted above. If Centry is such that the buyer prefers an auction to multilateral negotiations
for a certain number of invited sellers, the buyer might still prefer multilateral negotiations after suitably
reducing the number of invited sellers.
Figure 5 illustrates the buyer’s expected payoﬀ when it optimally chooses how many sellers to invite,
restricting attention to a setting in which there are N = 10 sellers available. Each panel reflects a diﬀerent
ratio of the discount rates, rBrS . Each line in Figure 5 is the upper envelope from plotting the buyer’s expected
payoﬀ for each number of invited sellers for a particular institution, such as the three reported in Figure 4.
Figure 5 Here
The first insight from Figure 5 is that, even optimizing over the number of invited sellers, the buyer
prefers multilateral negotiations for suﬃciently low values of Centry, and prefers a first-price auction for
suﬃciently high values of Centry. For very low values of Centry, all invited sellers participate even if all
sellers are invited. In this case the buyer invites all sellers and prefers multilateral negotiations, as shown in
Proposition 2. For values of Centry ∈
³
πmlnS (1), π
fpa
S (1)
´
, no sellers participate in multilateral negotiations,
but participate with positive probability in a first-price auction. Consequently, for such values of Centry
the buyer prefers a first-price auction to multilateral negotiations.
The second insight from Figure 5 is that the specifics of the buyer’s institutional choice are murky for
intermediate values of Centry. While there obviously is a change at some point from preferring multilateral
negotiations to preferring an auction, there can be multiple such changes as Centry increases. For example, in
panel (b) the buyer’s optimal choice is to invite 2 sellers and use multilateral negotiations when Centry = 0.14,
to invite 2 sellers and use a first-price auction when Centry = 0.17, and to invite 1 seller and use multilateral
negotiations when Centry = 0.23. Once Centry > 0.25 the buyer switches back to inviting 2 sellers and using
a first-price auction.
Finally, one could assess how the eﬀects of costly entry are influenced by the variance of the Vi draws.
An informal analysis similar to that in Subsection 4.2 suggests that the two institutions are equivalent if the
variance of the Vi draws is suﬃciently low. Hence, entry costs would not aﬀect the buyer’s institutional
choice.
5 Conclusions and Future Research
This paper develops a model of multilateral negotiations with complete information by adding additional
sellers to Rubinstein’s classic infinite-horizon alternating-oﬀers model of bilateral negotiations. The model’s
unique stationary SPNE outcomes involve the buyer trading immediately with the surplus-maximizing seller.
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The presence of additional sellers in certain instances provides a measure of protection to the buyer that
enables it to receive higher payoﬀs than it otherwise would. In other instances the additional sellers are
irrelevant, because the surplus available from trading with them is too low to give the buyer a credible
threat to trade with them if seller 1 is intransigent. In the limit as the time between oﬀers goes to 0, these
stationary outcomes have an intuitively appealing structure that is consonant with the SPNE outcome from
bilateral negotiations: The prospect of trade with seller 2 constrains the multilateral negotiations if and
only if V2 exceeds what the buyer would obtain in bilateral negotiations with seller 1.
I apply the model to the buyer’s choice between conducting procurement via multilateral negotiations
or an auction. As a general matter the buyer tends to prefer multilateral negotiations when the buyer is
relatively patient, when the sellers’ products are distinct or their production costs are quite diﬀerent, and
when there are few sellers. In such settings the buyer’s bargaining ability plays a significant role in the
negotiations, and the buyer forgoes that ability by conducting procurement with an auction. However,
the buyer prefers an auction if it is suﬃciently costly for sellers to participate in the procurement process,
because sellers’ anticipated low payoﬀs in multilateral negotiations make them less likely to participate than
if procurement were conducted with an auction. These diﬀerences in the buyer’s institutional preference
are maintained if the buyer can strategically limit the number of sellers it invites to participate, and a new
one emerges: For intermediate entry costs the buyer can prefer either institution, and the preferred choice
can change multiple times as the entry cost increases.
The analysis of the buyer’s choice helps explain why multilateral negotiations and auctions are used by
apparently similar buyers. In some instances the two institutions might coexist because each gives the
buyer the same expected payoﬀ, such as when there is little variation in the surpluses available from diﬀerent
sellers. In other instances buyers might have distinct preferences that depend on factors including variation
in the cost of sellers’ participation across buyers (say because of complexity in determining a seller’s fit with
the buyer’s preferences), diﬀerences in the buyers’ bargaining ability relative to the sellers’, or diﬀerences in
the buyers’ costs of conducting multilateral negotiations.
The model illustrates a setting in which multilateral negotiations can be evaluated straightforwardly,
and the following examples give a sense of the variety of ways in which it can be applied. One could use
the model to evaluate horizontal mergers in markets where the strategic interaction among firms involves
multilateral negotiations. The basic model is suﬃciently simple that one could include merger-specific
eﬃciencies or changes in bargaining positions, changes in product oﬀerings from the merging firms or their
rivals, or entry by new sellers. Likewise, one could consider collusion amongst sellers who repeatedly
compete for the business of buyers. The model’s emphasis on surplus allows consideration of cost diﬀerences
across sellers, or of horizontal and vertical product diﬀerentiation. One also could consider incentives
regarding dual-sourcing, sellers’ investments to reduce costs or improve their products’ goodness-of-fit with
the buyer’s preferences, the buyer’s design of its purchasing requirements, or joint decisions between the
buyer and each seller on relationship-specific investments. Finally, one could use the model as a starting
point for designing experiments. In addition to comparing experimental outcomes to the model’s predictions
regarding parameters such as the available surpluses, the parties’ discount rates, or the number of sellers, one
also can assess whether a structured model of multilateral negotiations can reasonably explain the outcomes
of more realistic unstructured negotiations.
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6 Appendix
This appendix contains proofs of Theorem 1, Corollary 1, and Propositions 1 and 2. It begins with several
lemmas that are used in the proof of Theorem 1.
I will frequently refer to SPNE strategies by σ ≡ {σB, σ1, σ2, ..., σN}, where σk denotes player k’s strategy
in the infinite-horizon game, for k ∈ {B, 1, . . . , N}. Let πsok and πbok respectively denote player k’s stationary
SPNE payoﬀs in subgames that begin with oﬀers from the sellers and from the buyer, for some SPNE σ.
Lemma 1 In subgames beginning with oﬀers from the sellers, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes in-
volve trade between the buyer and seller 1 in the subgame’s initial period.
Proof of Lemma 1: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the sellers, consider a SPNE σ
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πsok and π
bo
k . Note that π
so
B ≥ δBπboB , because the buyer always can let
play continue to the next period by rejecting all oﬀers in the subgame’s initial period.
I first show that σ involves trade between the buyer and seller 1. The proof involves three cases.
Case 1: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k 6= 1 for which Vk = V1. Relabel the
sellers so that trade involves seller 1.
Case 2: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k for which Vk < V1. By following σ,
πsoB ≤ Vk < V1 and πso1 = 0.
In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering the
buyer V1 −  > πsoB for some  > 0. First, the buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 1’s oﬀer, because the
payoﬀ V1 −  the buyer receives by accepting strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from accepting seller k’s oﬀer
(which is at most πsoB , depending on whether σ specified a trade in the subgame’s initial period), and its
payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (which is δBπboB ≤ πsoB ). Second,
seller 1 strictly prefers oﬀering V1−, because the payoﬀ  seller 1 receives by doing strictly exceeds its payoﬀ
from following σ (which is 0). The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot involve the buyer
trading with a seller k for which Vk < V1.
Case 3: Suppose σ involves no trade in any period. By following σ, πsoB = π
so
1 = π
bo
B = π
bo
1 = 0. In
the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering the buyer
V1 −  > 0 for some  > 0. First, the buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 1’s oﬀer, because the payoﬀ
V1−  the buyer receives by accepting strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from accepting any other seller’s oﬀer,
and its payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (both of which must be
0, else the buyer’s payoﬀ could not be 0 according to σ). Second, seller 1 strictly prefers oﬀering V1 − ,
because the payoﬀ  seller 1 receives by doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ (which is 0).
The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot involve no trade in any period.
Cases 1-3 exhaust all possibilities other than trading with seller 1, and so in all subgames beginning with
oﬀers from the sellers, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve trade with seller 1.
I next show that σ involves trade in the subgame’s initial period. Suppose not. Because of discounting,
this delay in trading implies πso1 + π
so
B < V1. In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can
profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering the buyer πsoB +  for some  > 0 such that π
so
1 + π
so
B +  < V1. First,
the buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 1’s oﬀer, because the payoﬀ πsoB +  the buyer receives by accepting
strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from accepting any other seller’s oﬀer (which is at most πsoB ), and its payoﬀ
from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (which is δBπboB ≤ πsoB ). Second, seller 1
strictly prefers oﬀering πsoB + , because the payoﬀ V1− (πsoB + ) seller 1 receives by doing so strictly exceeds
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its payoﬀ from following σ (which is πso1 < V1− (πsoB + )). The existence of this profitable deviation implies
σ cannot involve trade not occurring in the subgame’s initial period. ¥
Lemma 2 In subgames beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve
trade between the buyer and seller 1 in the subgame’s initial period.
Proof of Lemma 2: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, consider a SPNE σ
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πbok and π
so
k . Note that π
bo
B ≥ δBπsoB , because the buyer always can let
play continue to the next period by refusing to trade with any seller who accepted the buyer’s proposal in
the subgame’s initial period.
I first show that σ involves trade between the buyer and seller 1. The proof involves three cases.
Case 1: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k 6= 1 for which Vk = V1. Relabel the
sellers so that trade involves seller 1.
Case 2: Suppose σ involves trade between the buyer and a seller k for which Vk < V1. Trade must
occur in the subgame’s initial period, because by Lemma 1 trade involves the buyer and seller 1 if play
continues to the subgame’s next period. By following σ, πboB ≤ Vk < V1, and πbo1 = 0.
If πboB > δBπ
so
B , then in the subgame’s initial period I can show that the buyer can profitably deviate
from σ by oﬀering Vj to each seller j 6= 1, k , and oﬀering  > 0 to sellers 1 and k such that V1−  > Vk−  ≥
πboB −  > δBπsoB , and V1 −  > πboB . First consider the buyer’s decision to trade after the sellers make their
accept/reject decisions. If seller k accepts and seller 1 rejects, then the buyer strictly prefers trading with
seller k because the payoﬀ Vk−  the buyer receives by doing so strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from trading
with any other seller j 6= 1, k (which is 0), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period (which
is δBπsoB ). If seller 1 accepts, then the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 because the payoﬀ V1 − 
the buyer receives by doing so strictly exceeds both its payoﬀ from trading with any other seller (which is at
most Vk − ), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period (which is δBπsoB ). Next consider
the sellers’ accept/reject decisions after receiving the deviating oﬀers. In any equilibrium seller k accepts
if seller 1 rejects, because seller k anticipates trading with the buyer and receiving a payoﬀ  that strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting (which is 0). Consequently, in any equilibrium seller 1 must accept the
buyer’s deviating oﬀer, because it anticipates trading with the buyer and receiving a payoﬀ  that strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting (which is 0). Finally, making the specified deviating oﬀers gives the buyer
a strictly higher payoﬀ than from following σ. The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot
involve the buyer trading with a seller k for which Vk < V1.
If πboB = δBπ
so
B , then in the subgame’s initial period I can show that the buyer can profitably deviate
from σ by oﬀering Vj to each seller j 6= 1 , and oﬀering δ1 (V1 − πsoB ) +  < V1 to seller 1 for some  > 0.
First consider the buyer’s decision to trade after the sellers make their accept/reject decisions. If seller 1
accepts, then the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 because the payoﬀ V1 − δ1 (V1 − πsoB ) −  the
buyer receives by doing strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from trading with any other seller (which is 0), and its
payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period. To see the latter point, by trading with seller 1 the
buyer’s payoﬀ can be written as (1− δ1)V1 + δ1πsoB − . There are three cases to consider.
• If πsoB = V1, then by trading in the current period the buyer’s payoﬀ is V1 −  > δBV1 = πboB for
suﬃciently small  > 0. Thus, the buyer prefers trading in the current period.
• If 0 < πsoB < V1, then by trading in the current period the buyer’s payoﬀ strictly exceeds πsoB −  =
πboB
δB
−  > πboB , for suﬃciently small  > 0. Thus, the buyer prefers trading in the current period.
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• If 0 = πsoB , then πboB = 0, and by trading in the current period the buyer’s payoﬀ is (1− δ1)V1 −  > 0¡
= πboB
¢
for suﬃciently small  > 0. Thus, the buyer prefers trading in the current period.
Next consider the sellers’ accept/reject decisions. If the buyer oﬀers seller 1 δ1 (V1 − πsoB )+ , then seller
1 strictly prefers accepting. By accepting seller 1 anticipates trading with the buyer this period and getting
a payoﬀ of δ1 (V1 − πsoB ) + , while by rejecting seller 1 expects at best a strictly lower payoﬀ δ1 (V1 − πsoB ).
Therefore, making the specified oﬀers gives the buyer a strictly higher payoﬀ than from following σ. The
existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot involve the buyer trading with a seller k for which
Vk < V1.
Case 3: Suppose σ involves no trade in any period. Once play reaches the subgame’s second period
(in which sellers make oﬀers to the buyer), by Lemma 1 trade will occur, which is a contradiction.
Cases 1-3 exhaust all possibilities other than trading with seller 1, and so in all subgames beginning with
oﬀers from the buyer, all SPNE featuring stationary outcomes involve trade with seller 1.
I next show that σ involves trade in the subgame’s initial period. Suppose not. Because of discounting,
this delay in trading implies πbo1 + π
bo
B < V1. In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that the buyer can
profitably deviate from σ by oﬀering seller 1 πbo1 + for some  > 0 such that πbo1 +πboB + < V1, while making
oﬀers to the remaining sellers according to σ. First, the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 if seller
1 accepts this oﬀer, because the buyer’s payoﬀ V1 −
¡
πbo1 + 
¢
from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from
trading with any other seller (which is at most πboB ), and its payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play
continue to the next period (which is δBπsoB ≤ πboB ). Second, seller 1 strictly prefers accepting the buyer’s
oﬀer, because its payoﬀ πbo1 +  from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting the oﬀer (which is at
most πbo1 ). Therefore, the buyer strictly prefers oﬀering πbo1 +  to seller 1, because doing so gives the buyer
a strictly higher payoﬀ than from following σ. The existence of this profitable deviation implies σ cannot
involve trade not occurring in the subgame’s initial period. ¥
Lemma 3 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, πso1 = V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
.
Proof of Lemma 3: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the sellers, consider a SPNE σ
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πsok and π
bo
k .
Suppose πso1 < V1 − max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that seller 1 can
profitably deviate from σ by demanding πso1 +  < V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
, for some  > 0. The buyer strictly
prefers accepting this demand, because its payoﬀ from doing so is V1 − (πso1 + ) > max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
, where
max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
is the highest payoﬀ the buyer can get by rejecting seller 1’s demand (either at most V2
by trading this period with another seller, or δBπboB by rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the
next period). Given the buyer’s anticipated behavior, seller 1’s payoﬀ from demanding πso1 +  strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ (which is πso1 ). The existence of this profitable deviation implies that
πso1 ≥ V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
.
Now suppose πso1 > V1−max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. In the subgame’s initial period, by Lemma 1 the buyer’s payoﬀ
according to σ is V1 − πso1 < max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. If δBπboB ≥ V2, then the buyer strictly prefers rejecting all
oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period, because the buyer’s payoﬀ δBπboB from doing so strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ. If V2 > δBπboB , then seller 2 strictly prefers deviating from σ by oﬀering
V2−  > max
£
V1 − πso1 , δBπboB
¤
, for some  > 0. The buyer strictly prefers accepting seller 2’s oﬀer, because
the buyer’s payoﬀ V2− from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ both from accepting seller 1’s oﬀer (which is
V1−πso1 ), and its payoﬀ from rejecting all oﬀers and letting play continue to the next period (which is δBπboB ).
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Given the buyer’s anticipated behavior, seller 2’s payoﬀ  from oﬀering V2−  strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from
following σ (which is 0). The existence of these profitable deviations implies πso1 ≤ V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
.
The arguments in the two preceding paragraphs imply πso1 = V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. ¥
Lemma 4 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, if V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ), then πboB = V1.
Proof of Lemma 4: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, consider a SPNE σ
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πbok and π
so
k , and for which V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ).
Suppose πboB < V1. In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that the buyer can profitably deviate
from σ by demanding V1 − 2 > πboB from seller 1 and V2 −  > δB (V1 − πso1 ) from seller 2, for some  > 0,
and demanding 0 from all other sellers.
First consider the buyer’s decision whether to trade with any seller that has accepted the buyer’s proposal.
If seller 1 accepts the buyer’s oﬀer, then the buyer strictly prefers trading this period with seller 1, because
the buyer’s payoﬀ V1− 2 from doing so strictly exceeds the buyer’s payoﬀ from trading this period with any
other seller (which is at most V2 − ), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the next period (which
is δB (V1 − πso1 )). If seller 2 accepts the buyer’s oﬀer and seller 1 rejects, then the buyer strictly prefers
trading this period with seller 2, because the buyer’s payoﬀ V2 −  from doing so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ
from trading this period with any other seller (which is 0), and its payoﬀ from letting play continue to the
next period (which is δB (V1 − πso1 )).
Now consider the sellers’ decisions to accept or reject the buyer’s proposals. If seller 1 rejects the buyer’s
oﬀer, then seller 2 strictly prefers accepting to rejecting the buyer’s oﬀer: the buyer will trade this period
with seller 2, as noted in the preceding paragraph. Seller 2’s payoﬀ in this case is  > 0, which strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting the buyer’s oﬀer (which is 0).
Because of seller 2’s incentives, if seller 1 rejects the buyer’s oﬀer, then seller 1’s payoﬀ is 0. If seller 1
accepts the buyer’s oﬀer, then seller 1’s payoﬀ is 2 > 0. Hence, seller 1 accepts the buyer’s oﬀer

2 .
Finally, given the sellers’ anticipated behavior the buyer strictly prefers making these deviating oﬀers,
because the buyer’s payoﬀ V1 − 2 from doing strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from following σ. The existence of
this profitable deviation implies that it cannot be that πboB < V1, according to σ, so it must be the case that
πboB = V1. ¥
Lemma 5 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, if V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), then πboB = V1 − δ1πso1 .
Proof of Lemma 5: In an arbitrary subgame beginning with oﬀers from the buyer, consider a SPNE σ
that supports the stationary payoﬀs πbok and π
so
k , and for which V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ).
Suppose πboB < V1 − δ1πso1 . In the subgame’s initial period, I can show that the buyer can profitably
deviate from σ by demanding πboB +  from seller 1, for some  > 0 such that π
bo
B +  < V1 − δ1πso1 . First
consider the buyer’s decision to trade after the sellers make their accept/reject decisions. If seller 1 accepts,
then the buyer strictly prefers trading with seller 1 this period, because the buyer’s payoﬀ πboB +  from doing
so strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from trading with another seller or letting play continue to next period (both of
which are at most πboB ). Next consider the sellers’ accept/reject decisions after observing the deviating oﬀer.
Seller 1 strictly prefers accepting the oﬀer, because seller 1’s payoﬀ V1 −
¡
πboB + 
¢
from doing so strictly
exceeds its payoﬀ from rejecting (which is at most δ1πso1 ). Given seller 1’s anticipated behavior, the buyer
strictly prefers deviating from σ in this fashion, because the buyer’s payoﬀ πboB +  doing so strictly exceeds
its payoﬀ from following σ. The existence of this profitable deviation implies that πboB ≥ V1 − δ1πso1 .
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Now suppose πboB > V1−δ1πso1 . By following σ, according to Lemma 2 trade takes place in the subgame’s
initial period, which implies seller 1’s payoﬀ is πbo1 = V1 − πboB . If seller 1 deviates from σ by rejecting the
buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer, and if the buyer does not trade with any other seller in the subgame’s initial period,
then seller 1’s payoﬀ is δ1πso1 > πbo1 . If seller 1 rejects the buyer’s oﬀer, then the buyer will not trade with
any other seller in the subgame’s initial period. The highest payoﬀ the buyer can get is V2 by trading with
seller 2, but by waiting until the next period the buyer gets a payoﬀ of δB (V1 − πso1 ) > V2. Therefore, it is
profitable for seller 1 to reject the buyer’s equilibrium oﬀer in the subgame’s initial period, which contradicts
σ as a SPNE. Therefore, it must be the case that πboB ≤ V1 − δ1πso1 .
The arguments in the two preceding paragraphs imply πboB = V1 − δ1πso1 . ¥
Lemma 6 In all stationary SPNE outcomes, if V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ), then πso1 = V1 − V2δB .
Proof of Lemma 6: Follows from simple algebra. ¥
With the preceding results, the stationary equilibrium payoﬀs can be derived for each of four cases.
6.1 Case 1: V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 )
Lemma 7 If V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), then
πboB =
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 πbo1 = δ1
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1 πsoB = δB
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 πso1 =
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1.
Proof of Lemma 7: By Lemma 3, πso1 = V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. Substituting the expression for πso1 into
the condition for Lemma 7 requires V2 < δBmax
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
, so for Lemma 7’s condition to hold requires
δBπboB = max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
.
By Lemma 5, πboB = V1 − δ1πso1 . Substituting the expression for πso1 into the expression for πboB yields
πboB = V1 − δ1
¡
V1 − δBπboB
¢
⇐⇒ πboB =
µ
1− δ1
1− δ1δB
¶
V1.
Substituting the derived value for πboB into the expression for π
so
1 yields π
so
1 =
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1. By Lemmas 1
and 2, πbo1 = δ1
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1 and πsoB = δB
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1. These are the desired results. ¥
Lemma 8 If V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), then V2 < δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1.
Proof of Lemma 8: If V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), then πso1 =
³
1−δB
1−δ1δB
´
V1 by Lemma 7. Substituting that
expression into the condition for Lemma 8 yields V2 < δ
2
B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1, which is the desired result. ¥
6.2 Case 2: V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 ≥ δBπboB
Lemma 9 If V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 ≥ δBπboB , then
πboB = V1 π
bo
1 = 0 π
so
B = V2 π
so
1 = V1 − V2.
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Proof of Lemma 9: By Lemma 3, πso1 = V1 − max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
, so the second condition for Lemma 9
implies πso1 = V1 − V2. By Lemma 4, πboB = V1. By Lemmas 1 and 2, πbo1 = 0 and πsoB = V2. These are the
desired results. ¥
Lemma 10 If V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 ≥ δBπboB , then V2 ≥ δBV1.
Proof of Lemma 10: If V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 ≥ δBπboB , then substituting the stationary SPNE
payoﬀs derived in Lemma 9 into the conditions for Lemma 10 yields V2 > δBV2 and V2 ≥ δBV1. The first
constraint holds trivially, so the relevant constraint is the second one. This is the desired result. ¥
6.3 Case 3: V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 < δBπboB
Lemma 11 If V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 < δBπboB , then
πboB = V1 π
bo
1 = 0 π
so
B = δBV1 π
so
1 = (1− δB)V1.
Proof of Lemma 11: By Lemma 4, πboB = V1. By Lemma 3, π
so
1 = V1 −max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
, so the second
condition for Lemma 11 implies πso1 = (1− δB)V1. By Lemmas 1 and 2, πbo1 = 0 and πsoB = δBV1. These
are the desired results. ¥
Lemma 12 If V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 < δBπboB , then δ
2
BV1 < V2 < δBV1.
Proof of Lemma 12: If V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 < δBπboB , then substituting the stationary SPNE
payoﬀs derived in Lemma 11 into the conditions for Lemma 12 yields V2 > δ2BV1 and V2 < δBV1. These are
the desired results. ¥
6.4 Case 4: V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 )
Lemma 13 If V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ), then
πboB =
V2
δ2B
πbo1 = V1 − V2δ2B π
so
B =
V2
δB
πso1 = V1 − V2δB .
Proof of Lemma 13: By Lemma 6, πso1 = V1 − V2δB . By Lemma 3, π
so
1 = V1 − max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
, so
substituting the value of πso1 derived in Lemma 6 yields
V2
δB
= max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. Given that δB < 1, it must
be that δBπboB = max
£
V2, δBπboB
¤
. Therefore, πboB =
V2
δ2B
. By Lemmas 1 and 2, πbo1 = V1− V2δ2B and π
so
B =
V2
δB
.
These are the desired results. ¥
Lemma 14 If V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ), then δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 ≤ V2 ≤ δ2BV1.
Proof of Lemma 14: If V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ), then the stationary SPNE payoﬀs derived in Lemma 13 are
πso1 = V1 − V2δB and π
bo
B =
V2
δ2B
. From the first expression, the restriction that πso1 ≥ 0 implies that the
proposed solution’s validity requires V2 ≤ δBV1. From the second expression, the restriction that πboB ≤ V1
implies that the proposed solution’s validity requires V2 ≤ δ2BV1. The second constraint is tighter than is
the first, so the second constraint is the relevant of the two constraints.
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Another restriction is that πbo1 ≤ δ1πso1 . If not, then the buyer would be oﬀering seller 1 strictly more
than necessary to induce seller 1 to accept the buyer’s oﬀer. Given the values of the stationary SPNE payoﬀs
derived in Lemma 13, the proposed solution’s validity requires
V1 −
V2
δ2B
≤ δ1
µ
V1 −
V2
δB
¶
⇐⇒ δ2B
µ
1− δ1
1− δ1δB
¶
V1 ≤ V2.
Combining the two parameter restrictions implies that the proposed solution’s validity requires δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1 ≤
V2 ≤ δ2BV1, which is the desired result. ¥
The preceding Lemmas now can be used to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof separately considers four sets of possible values for V2.
If V2 ∈
h
0, δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1
´
, then V2 /∈
h
δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1, V1
i
. The contrapositives of Lemmas 10 and
12 imply it is not the case that V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ), while the contrapositive of Lemma 14 implies that it is
not the case that V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ). Hence, it must be the case that V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ). Therefore, by
Lemma 7 the payoﬀs must be as specified in Theorem 1.
If V2 ∈
h
δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1, δ
2
BV1
i
, then V2 /∈
h
0, δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1
´
and V2 /∈
¡
δ2BV1, V1
¤
. The contrapositive
of Lemma 8 implies that it is not the case that V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), while the contrapositives of Lemmas 10
and 12 imply it is not the case that V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ). Hence, it must be the case that V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ).
Therefore, by Lemma 13 the payoﬀs must be as specified in Theorem 1.
If V2 ∈
¡
δ2BV1, δBV1
¢
, then V2 /∈
h
0, δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1
´
, V2 /∈
h
δ2B
³
1−δ1
1−δ1δB
´
V1, δ
2
BV1
i
, and V2 /∈ [δBV1, V1].
The contrapositive of Lemma 8 implies that it is not the case that V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), the contrapositive
of Lemma 14 implies that it is not the case that V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ), while the contrapositive of Lemma 10
implies that it is not the case that both V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 ≥ δBπboB hold. Hence, it must be the
case that V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 < δBπboB . Therefore, by Lemma 11 the payoﬀs must be as specified in
Theorem 1.
If V2 ∈ [δBV1, V1], then V2 /∈ [0, δBV1). The contrapositive of Lemma 8 implies that it is not the case that
V2 < δB (V1 − πso1 ), the contrapositive of Lemma 14 implies that it is not the case that V2 = δB (V1 − πso1 ),
while the contrapositive of Lemma 12 implies that it is not the case that both V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and
V2 < δBπboB hold. Hence, it must be the case that V2 > δB (V1 − πso1 ) and V2 ≥ δBπboB . Therefore, by
Lemma 9 the payoﬀs must be as specified in Theorem 1. ¥
Proof of Corollary 1: Recalling that the discount factor δk is defined as δk ≡ e−rk∆, the buyer’s payoﬀs
from Theorem 1 can be written as
πboB =
³
1−e−r1∆
1−e−r1∆e−rB∆
´
V1 if V2 ∈
h
0, e−2rB∆
³
1−e−r1∆
1−e−r1∆e−rB∆
´
V1
´
πboB =
V2
e−2rB∆
if V2 ∈
h
e−2rB∆
³
1−e−r1∆
1−e−r1∆e−rB∆
´
V1, e−2rB∆V1
i
πboB = V1 if V2 ∈
¡
e−2rB∆V1, e−rB∆V1
¢
πboB = V1 if V2 ∈
£
e−rB∆V1, V1
¤
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and
πsoB = e
−rB∆
³
1−e−r1∆
1−e−r1∆e−rB∆
´
V1 if V2 ∈
h
0, e−2rB∆
³
1−e−r1∆
1−e−r1∆e−rB∆
´
V1
´
πsoB =
V2
e−rB∆
if V2 ∈
h
e−2rB∆
³
1−e−r1∆
1−e−r1∆e−rB∆
´
V1, e−2rB∆V1
i
πsoB = e
−rB∆V1 if V2 ∈
¡
e−2rB∆V1, e−rB∆V1
¢
πsoB = V2 if V2 ∈
£
e−rB∆V1, V1
¤
.
By Lemmas 1 and 2 one can derive the associated values for πbo1 and π
so
1 . Taking the limit as ∆ −→ 0
requires using L’Hopital’s rule, which gives the desired result. ¥
6.5 Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Proof of Proposition 1: The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if its payoﬀ from
multilateral negotiations strictly exceeds its payoﬀ from a first-price auction. That condition amounts to
πmlnB > π
fpa
B ⇐⇒ max
∙
V2,
µ
r1
r1 + rB
¶
V1
¸
− Cmln > V2.
The latter expression is equivalent to
Cmln < max
∙
0,
µ
r1
r1 + rB
¶
V1 − V2
¸
, (1)
which is the desired result.
The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as πmlnB − π
fpa
B increases. That
condition corresponds to relaxing (1), which is accomplished by decreasing Cmln, increasing V1, decreasing
V2, or decreasing rBr1 . ¥
Proof of Proposition 2: The buyer strictly prefers multilateral negotiations if and only if its expected
payoﬀ from multilateral negotiations strictly exceeds its expected payoﬀ from a first-price auction. That
condition amounts to
πmlnB > π
fpa
B ⇐⇒
N − 1 +
³
rS
rS+rB
´N
N + 1
− Cmln > N − 1
N + 1
.
The latter expression is equivalent to
Cmln <
³
rS
rS+rB
´N
N + 1
, (2)
which is the desired result.
The buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations intensifies as πmlnB − π
fpa
B increases. That
condition corresponds to relaxing (2), which is accomplished by decreasing Cmln, decreasing N , or decreasing
rB
r1
. ¥
References
[1] Ausubel, L., Cramton, P., and Deneckere, R. (2002) “Bargaining with Incomplete Information,” in
Aumann, R., and Hart, S. (eds.) Handbook of Game Theory 3 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V.).
23
[2] Binmore, K., Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1989) “An Outside Option Experiment,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 104, 753-770.
[3] Bulow, J., and Klemperer, P. (1996) “Auctions Versus Negotiations,” American Economic Review
86(1), 180-194.
[4] Bulow, J., and Klemperer, P. (2009) “Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?,” American Economic
Review 99(4), 1544-1575.
[5] Chamberlin, E. (1948) “An Experimental Imperfect Market,” Journal of Political Economy 56, 95-108.
[6] Chatterjee, K., and Dutta, B. (1998) “Rubinstein Auctions: On Competition for Bargaining Partners,”
Games and Economic Behavior 23(2), 119-145.
[7] Chatterjee, K., and Lee, C. (1998) “Bargaining and Search with Incomplete Information About Outside
Options,” Games and Economic Behavior 22(2), 203-237.
[8] Dixit, A., and Shapiro, C. (1986) “Entry Dynamics with Mixed Strategies,” in Thomas, L.G. (ed.)
The Economics of Strategic Planning (Lexington: Lexington Books).
[9] Hendon, E., and Tranaes, T. (1991) “Sequential Bargaining in a Market with One Seller and Two
Diﬀerent Buyers,” Games and Economic Behavior 3(4), 453-466.
[10] Kennan, J., and Wilson, R. (1993) “Bargaining with Private Information,” Journal of Economic Liter-
ature 31, 45-104.
[11] Kim, J., and Che, Y.-K. (2004) “Asymmetric Information About Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions,”
Games and Economic Behavior 46, 383-397.
[12] Krishna, V., and Serrano, R. (1996) “Multilateral Bargaining,” Review of Economic Studies 63(1),
61-80.
[13] Lang, K., and Rosenthal, R. (1991) “The Contractors’ Game,” RAND Journal of Economics 22(3),
329—338.
[14] Levin, D., and Smith, J. (1994) “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry,” American Economic Review
84(3), 585—599.
[15] Marx, L., and Shaﬀer, G. (2010) “Break-up Fees and Bargaining Power in Sequential Contracting,”
International Journal of Industrial Organization 28, 451-463.
[16] McAdams, D., and Schwarz, M. (2007) “Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries,” American
Economic Review 97(1), 260-276.
[17] McAfee, R.P., and McMillan, J. (1987) “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature 25,
699-738.
[18] McAfee, R.P., and Vincent, D. (1997) “Sequentially Optimal Auctions,” Games and Economic Behavior
18(2), 246-276.
[19] Milgrom, P. (1989) “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 3-22.
24
[20] Muthoo, A. (1995) “On the Strategic Role of Outside Options in Bilateral Bargaining,” Operations
Research 43(2), 292-297.
[21] Muthoo, A. (1999) Bargaining Theory with Applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
[22] Reinganum, J., and Daughety, A. (1991) “Endogenous Availability in Search Equilibrium,” RAND
Journal of Economics 22(2), 287-306.
[23] Reinganum, J., and Daughety, A. (1992) “Search Equilibrium with Endogenous Recall,” RAND Journal
of Economics 23(2), 184-202.
[24] Rubinstein, A. (1982) “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica 50(1), 97-109.
[25] Serrano, R. (2008) “Bargaining,” in S. Durlauf and L. Blume (eds.)
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd edition (London: McMillan).
[26] Shaked, A. (1994) “Opting Out: Bazaars Versus Hi Tech Markets,” Investigaciones Economicas 18(3),
421-432.
[27] Shaked, A., and Sutton, J. (1984) “Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining
Model,” Econometrica 52, 1351-1364.
[28] Smith, V. (1962) “An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 70(2), 111-137.
[29] Thomas, C.J. (2011) “Equilibrium Behavior in a Model of Multilateral Negotiations,” working paper,
Clemson University.
[30] Thomas, C.J., and Wilson, B.J. (2002) “A Comparison of Auctions and Multilateral Negotiations,”
RAND Journal of Economics 33(1), 140-155.
[31] Thomas, C.J., and Wilson, B.J. (2005) “Verifiable Oﬀers and the Relationship Between Auctions and
Multilateral Negotiations,” Economic Journal 115(506), 1016-1031.
[32] Thomas, C.J., and Wilson, B.J. (2012) “Horizontal Product Diﬀerentiation in Auctions and Multilateral
Negotiations,” Economica, forthcoming.
[33] Vincent, D. (1992) “Modelling Competitive Behavior,” RAND Journal of Economics 23(4), 590-599.
25
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 1. Buyer’s Stationary Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations, as a Function of V2. Panel (a) shows the 
buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of V2, in subgames beginning with offers from the buyer.  Panel (b) shows 
the buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of V2, in subgames beginning with offers from the sellers.  These figures 
are calculated using V1 = 1, δ1 = 0.8, δB = 0.8.  Dashed line is 45○-line.
(a)  Buyer’s stationary SPNE payoffs when buyer makes offers
(b)  Buyer’s stationary SPNE payoffs when sellers make offers
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Figure 2. Buyer’s Stationary Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations, as a Function of δB. Panel (a) shows the 
buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of δB, in subgames beginning with offers from the buyer.  Panel (b) shows 
the buyer’s SPNE payoffs as a function of δB, in subgames beginning with offers from the sellers.  These figures 
are calculated using V1 = 1 , V2 = 0.6, δ1 = 0.8.  Solid line is stationary SPNE payoff, and dashed line is SPNE 
payoff from bilateral negotiations.
(a)  Buyer’s stationary SPNE payoffs when buyer makes offers
(b)  Buyer’s stationary SPNE payoffs when sellers make offers
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Figure 3.  Comparative Statics of Buyer’s Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations and a First-Price Auction.
Each panel shows the buyer’s payoffs with initial parameters and with one changed parameter (changes denoted 
by a tilde).  Panel (a) decreases Cmln, panel (b) increases V1, and panel (c) decreases V2.  Each change intensifies 
the buyer’s relative preference for multilateral negotiations over a first-price auction.
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Figure 4. Buyer’s Expected Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations and a First-Price Auction, with Fixed 
Number of Sellers. Each panel shows the buyer’s payoffs for a particular value of N, and with different ratios 
of discount rates rB/rS.  N = 2 in panel (a), N = 4 in panel (b), and N = 6 in panel (c).  Multilateral negotiation 
payoffs are dashed lines, first-price auction payoff is solid line.
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(c)  N = 6
(b)  N = 4
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Figure 5. Buyer’s Expected Payoffs in Multilateral Negotiations and a First-Price Auction, with Optimal 
Number of Sellers. Each panel shows the buyer’s payoffs for a particular  ratio of discount factors, and with 
optimal number of invited sellers. rB/rS = 0.25 in panel (a), rB/rS = 1 in panel (b), and rB/rS = 4 in panel (c).  
Multilateral negotiation payoff is dashed line, first-price auction payoff is solid line.
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